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The “Fight for 15”: Can the Organizing Model that 
Helped Pass Seattle’s $15 Minimum Wage Legislation 
Fill the Gap Left by the Decline in Unions? 
Mary Hannah
*
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, Arisleyda Tapia, mother to then five-year-old Ashley, 
lived in New York City and worked thirty hours a week at 
McDonald’s.1 Tapia was one of the first fast-food employees to join 
the “Fight for 15” to protest the poverty wages and advocate for 
unionization.
2
 As a result, she was fired, then re-hired by “cooler 
management heads,” and then had her hours cut from forty per week 
to thirty.
3
 After working at McDonald’s for eight years, Tapia makes 
$8.35 per hour, survives on government subsidies, and only joined 
the “Fight for 15” after her manager forced her to come to work with 
a fever.
4
  
Tapia is representative of many fast-food employees unable to 
unionize and who struggle to survive off minimum wage. In 2014, 
SeaTac, Washington, a suburb of Seattle, became the first 
municipality to raise the minimum wage from the federal minimum 
of $7.25 an hour
5
 to $15.00 an hour and was followed by the City of 
 
 * J.D. (2016), Washington University School of Law. Thank you to my husband, 
family, and friends for all your support and encouragement. Thank you especially to everyone 
on the Journal of Law & Policy for your hard work, camaraderie, and giving a voice to all 
members of our society. 
 1. William Finnegan, Dignity: Fast-Food Workers and a New Form of Labor Activism, 
NEW YORKER (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/15/dignity-4. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
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Seattle’s own minimum wage raise.6 While Washington state’s 
minimum wage in 2014 was $9.32,
7
 already higher than the federal 
minimum, the increase could be especially beneficial to fast-food 
workers. Nation-wide nearly 47 percent of workers earning minimum 
wage are in the food service industry, including fast food.
8
 Frustrated 
by low wages and angered by the disparity between executives’ high 
pay and their own minimum wage,
9
 on November 29, 2012, over two 
hundred fast-food workers, including Tapia, walked off the job and 
demanded fair pay and the right to unionize without retaliation.
10
 
Fast-food workers credit this initial protest, and the subsequent two 
years of protests and organizing, for making Seattle’s $15 per hour 
minimum wage possible.
11
 
Campaigns for higher wages within a single industry typically 
involve union strikes or direct negotiations with the employer rather 
than a national walkout. However, the fast-food industry has 
historically been unable to unionize and employs predominately low-
income workers for minimum wage, low-skill service jobs, who 
survive as the working poor.
12
 Because of the difficulties unionizing 
 
 6. David Rolf, Thinking Bigger in Local Minimum Wage Campaigns: The Fight for $15 
in Seattle, ASPEN J. IDEAS (July-Aug. 2014), http://aspen.us/journal/editions/ julyaugust-
2014/thinking-bigger-local-minimum-wage-campaigns-fight-15-seattle. The $15 minimum 
wage was initially put on the ballot as leverage in the fight to unionize Alaska Airlines 
employees. Ben Bergman, The Accidental Origin of the $15 Minimum-wage Movement, 
MARKETPLACE (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.marketplace.org/2015/01/30/economy/ accidental-
origin-15-minimum-wage-movement.  
 7. History of Washington Minimum Wage, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., 
http://www.lni.wa.gov/WorkplaceRights/Wages/Minimum/History/default.asp (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2016). 
 8. Drew DeSilver, Who Makes Minimum Wage, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/08/who-makes-minimum-wage/. 
 9. Steven Greenhouse, Fighting Back Against Wretched Wages, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/sunday-review/fighting-back-against-wretched-
wages.html. 
 10. See Finnegan, supra note 1. While the National Labor Relations Board prohibits 
employer retaliation for unionization and organizing activities, it continues to occur. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158 (2006). KATE BRONFENBRENNER, NO HOLDS BARRED: THE INTENSIFICATION OF 
EMPLOYER OPPOSITION TO ORGANIZING 12 (2009), available at http://www.epi.org/files/page/-
/pdf/bp235.pdf (finding 34% of Employers discharge workers for union activity).  
 11. See Finnegan, supra note 1. 
 12. Id. See also, Matt Tripp, Why Aren’t Fast-Food Workers Unionized?, EATER (Apr. 23, 
2015), http://www.eater.com/2015/4/23/8463405/fast-food-workers-union-mcdonalds-fight for15; 
Sarah Jaffe, McJobs Should Pay, Too: Inside Fast-Food Workers’ Historic Protest For Living 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/15
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and the decline of unions across the country, fast-food workers and 
unions are searching for new methods of organization and advocacy 
to fill the gap left by the decrease in union membership in the United 
States.
13
 This Note will examine whether the organizational methods 
successfully employed by the “Fight for 15” fast-food worker 
movement in Seattle is the answer to protecting fast-food workers.  
The structure of fast-food employment makes organizing a union 
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) extraordinarily 
difficult due to high turnover of employees, the low-skilled nature of 
the job, and the franchise model.
14
 Accordingly, a new model of 
organization, one that works “outside” of the NLRA, is needed to 
advocate for workers.
15
 While worker organization to push broad 
legislative changes, such as a $15 minimum wage, is a critical piece, 
it is not the sole solution to protecting workers’ rights and needs, as 
legislative change is heavily dependent on the political culture of 
communities and often slow to happen. This Note proposes that to 
more effectively protect the rights of fast-food workers, workers 
should expand the use of worker centers and explore the role of 
workers’ councils. Limited by the NLRA restrictions on unions and 
employers, utilizing these two methods of organization and 
 
Wages, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 29, 2012) (“[M]any [fast-food jobs] are low-skill service jobs in 
an efficient assembly where workers are easily replaced and don’t require much education.”).  
 13. Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States: 
Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385, 395 (2005–2006). 
 14. Josh Sanburn, Fast Food Strikes: Unable to Unionize, Workers Borrow Tactics From 
‘Occupy,’ TIME (July 30, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/07/30/fast-food-strikes-unable-
to-unionize-workers-borrow-tactics-from-occupy/. See also Tripp, supra note 12. Because of 
the high rate of turnover, the large number of teenagers in their workforce, and the difficulty, 
due to the franchise model, of organizing workers in multiple work places with multiple 
employers, fast-food employees have struggled to meet the requirements under the NLRA to 
establish a union. Sévrine Knuchel, Examining Workers’ Rights in International Human Rights 
Law: The Fast-Food Workers’ Movement in the United States, 33 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 
10 (2015). See also Josh Eidelson, The SEIU’s Odd Recipe for Unionizing Fast Food, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 2, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
07-02/for-fast-food-labor-unions-seiu-has-odd-recipe. 
 15. The NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006), is the basic legal instrument or statute that 
“defin[es] the legal rights of organized groups of workers and workers in the process of 
organizing.” See Julie Yates Rivchin, Building Power Among Low-Wage Immigrant Workers: 
Some Legal Considerations for Organizing Structures and Strategies, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 397, 405 (2004). 
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collaboration, along with continued legislative pressure, provides 
better protection and methods for achieving worker goals.  
Part I of this Note examines the history of fast food, its 
employees, and the history of the NLRA and unionization. Part II 
analyzes the barriers to unionization for fast-food workers and breaks 
down the “Fight for 15” in Seattle. Part III proposes utilizing worker 
centers and exploring workers’ councils as alternative methods for 
meeting worker needs while continuing to push for legislative change 
through the “Fight for 15” protests.  
I. HISTORY 
A. Fast Food 
In 1948, the McDonald brothers, Mac and Richard, revolutionized 
the hamburger service industry and eliminated the need for well-
trained short-order cooks at their hamburger stand in San Bernardino, 
California
16
 Later, fast-food restaurants began to gain popularity in 
1954 when Ray Kroc purchased the franchise rights to the 
McDonalds’ restaurant and opened new locations.17 
The McDonald brothers modeled their new method, the Speedee 
Service System, from assembly line techniques that concentrated on a 
factory’s speed and volume of its flow of goods—in this case, 
hamburgers.
18
 A single worker was trained on one task in the 
assembly process of making a hamburger. Eliminating skilled cooks 
dramatically cut training costs and allowed McDonald’s to hire low-
skilled workers, train them quickly, and produce more hamburgers at 
a lower cost than competitors.
19
 This shift in technology also allowed 
adolescents and other low-skilled workers to be hired in large 
numbers.
20
  
 
 16. ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN 
MEAL 19–20 (Houghton Mifflin 2001).  
 17. Malcolm Gladwell, The Trouble with Fries, NEW YORKER (Mar. 5, 2001), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/03/05/the-trouble-with-fries. 
 18. Id. at 20, 68.  
 19. Id. at 19–20.  
 20. Id. at 68. As the training is minimal, even managers are sometimes in their late teens. 
Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/15
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After applying the assembly line to cooking, McDonald’s 
“routinized” cooking by creating a detailed production system 
manual with precise instructions on how to prepare every item of 
food.
21
 This “routinization” of fast food gives McDonald’s substantial 
control over the workers.
22
 By creating standardized products, 
processes, and machines, the corporation “impose[s] its own rules 
about pace, output, quality, and technique,” giving the restaurant 
extensive control over production.
23
 In essence, employees’ “power” 
gained from specialized knowledge about the work has shifted to 
corporate management, as machines and directions supply most of 
the “skills.” Accordingly, the increased expendability of workers 
expands the employer’s power to dictate “wages, hours, and working 
conditions.”24  
To maximize profits and increase employer flexibility, fast-food 
restaurants seek out unskilled employees willing to accept low pay 
for part-time hours rather than a stable, well-trained workforce.
25
 
Historically, teenagers were ideal candidates because of their low 
cost of living and ability to work for low wages.
26
 
 
 21. Id. at 69. There are also pictorial instructions on the ovens and machines themselves. 
Currently, the McDonald’s 750-page operation manual, colloquially known as “The Bible,” 
details everything from cooking to restaurant layout and appearance to how employees should 
greet customers. Id. at 69–70.  
 22. ROBIN LEIDNER, FAST FOOD, FAST TALK: SERVICE WORK AND THE ROUTINIZATION 
OF EVERYDAY LIFE 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1993); See also NEWMAN, infra 
note 29. Newman concludes the work has been so “dumbed down” that there is little 
independent judgment left in the job. NEWMAN, infra note 29, at 140; See also BARBARA 
GARSON, THE ELECTRONIC SWEATSHOP: HOW COMPUTERS ARE TRANSFORMING THE OFFICE 
OF THE FUTURE 37 (Penguin Books 1989); But see NEWMAN, infra note 29, at 141 (highlighting 
Newman’s graduate student, Eric Clemons’, report on the complexities of dealing with no-
shows, botched orders, and the lightening pace of working in a fast-food establishment). 
 23. See LEIDNER, supra note 22, at 3. In discussing the “de-skilling” of the fast-food 
industry and the routinization behind its success, Robin Leidner observes, “[w]hen management 
determines exactly how every task is to be done, it loses much of its dependence on the 
cooperation and good faith of workers and can impose its own rules about pace, output, quality, 
and technique.” Id.  
 24. See id. However, this statement is simplistic and an inadequate explanation of the 
complete dynamics between management and workers with regards to interactive service work, 
or work that involves face-to-face interaction with customers. Id.  
 25. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 16, at 68. Schlosser explains that teenagers “have been the 
perfect candidates for these jobs, not only because they are less expensive to hire than adults, 
but also because their youthful inexperience makes them easier to control.” Id.  
 26. Id. at 70. Teenagers also benefit by padding their resume with a fast food “starter job” 
as few employers would hire young employees with limited to no skills. Id. While teenagers 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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However, as the teenage baby boom generation grew up, the work 
force shrank while the industry expanded.
27
 Fast-food restaurants 
turned to a new labor market of marginalized workers: immigrants, 
the elderly, and the handicapped—segments of the population often 
willing to work for low wages.
28
  
The struggles of impoverished fast-food workers are well 
documented. Tyree Johnson, forty-four-year-old Chicagoan, has 
worked at two different McDonald’s restaurants for twenty years, 
makes the Illinois minimum wage, and bathes in the restaurant 
bathroom between shifts.
29
 Unlike the historical teenage workforce, 
80 percent of fast-food employees today are over the age of twenty.
30
 
Additionally, more than half of fast-food workers’ families receive 
some kind of government assistance.
31
  
In 2013, there were 3.6 million fast-food employees working in 
the United States.
32
 Approximately 90 percent of fast-food workers 
 
still work in fast-food, there is an increasing number of older adults working in fast food and 
staying longer. See McGregor, infra note 30.  
 27. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 16, at 70; See also McDonald’s: The Rise and Stall, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 2, 2003, 11:00 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/ 
2003-03-02/online-extra-mcdonalds-the-rise-and-stall. McDonald’s went public in 1965, and by 
1970, a McDonald’s restaurant existed in every state in the United States. Id.  
 28. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 16, at 70.  
 29. Leslie Patton, McDonald’s $8.25 Man and $8.75 Million CEO Shows Pay Gap, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 11, 2012, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2012-12-12/mcdonald-s-8-25-man-and-8-75-million-ceo-shows-pay-gap. For further 
reading, see KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING POOR IN THE 
INNER CITY (Random House Books 1999) (following several fast-food workers living in New 
York City and struggling to survive on minimum wage). 
 30. Jena McGregor, Fast Food Workers Are Staying Longer on the Job and Wanting 
More, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-leadership/ 
wp/2013/08/29/fast-food-workers-are-staying-longer-on-the-job-and-wanting-more/. See also 
NEWMAN, supra note 29.  
 31. SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO ET AL., UC BERKELEY CTR. FOR LABOR RESEARCH & EDUC., 
FAST FOOD POVERTY WAGES: THE PUBLIC COST OF LOW WAGE JOBS IN THE FAST-FOOD 
INDUSTRY 1 (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2013/fast_ 
food_poverty_wages.pdf. “52 percent of the families of front-line fast-food workers are 
enrolled in one or more public programs, compared to 25 percent of the workforce as a whole.” 
Id. The cost of providing public assistance for fast-food workers’ families is approximately $7 
billion per year. Id.  
 32. Number of Employees in the United States Fast Food Restaurant Industry from 2004 
to 2018, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/196630/number-of-employees-in-us-fast-
food-restaurants-since-2002/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2016). In 2013, there were 3,653,168 fast-
food workers in the United States, expected to rise to 3.7 million in 2018. Id. IBIS, a market 
research organization analyzing a variety of industries, defines the fast-food industry as 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/15
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are paid an hourly wage, provided no benefits, and scheduled to work 
only as needed or unexpectedly kept longer or sent home early.
33
 The 
typical fast-food employee “works thirty hours per week, compared 
to forty for the workforce as a whole,”34 and their schedules 
constantly change with short notice.
35
 In 2015, the average annual 
wage of a fast-food worker was $19,820 ($9.53 per hour), compared 
to the average national annual wage of $ 48,320.
36
 Despite the spike 
in profits and number of restaurants, fast-food workers are making 27 
percent less than they used to in the late 1960s.
37
 In contrast, the 
McDonald’s CEO made $8.75 million in 2011.38  
Fast-food workers are part of the 28 million workers who make up 
the bottom 20 percent of American workers by income.
39
 Since 2009, 
 
“restaurants where patrons pay before eating. Purchases may be consumed on-site, taken out or 
delivered.” Id. In 2013, YUM! Brands Inc., which owns Kentucky Fried Chicken, Pizza Hut, 
and Taco Bell, had approximately 539,000 employees, with about 86 percent of employees 
working part-time. Id. 
 33. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 16, at 73–74. How busy or slow the restaurant is dictates 
whether management sends home or calls in extra, non-scheduled workers. Id.  
 34. See ALLEGRETTO ET AL., supra note 31, at 8. A typical McDonald’s restaurant 
employs around fifty employees with each employee working about thirty hours per week. See 
SCHLOSSER, supra note 16, at 74. “The large majority of fast-food employees work part time,” 
which avoids triggering the overtime pay requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 
Robin Leidner, Fast-Food Work in the United States, in LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL 
FAST-FOOD INDUSTRY 14 (Tony Royle & Brian Towers eds., 2002). FLSA mandates overtime 
pay for each hour worked over forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2015). The Fair Labor 
Standards Act does not mandate a set number of hours or consistent hours. Id.  
 35. Jodi Kantor, Working Anything but 9 to 5: Scheduling Technology Leaves Low-
Income Parents with Hours of Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2014/08/13/us/starbucks-workers-scheduling-hours.html?_r=0. 
 36. May 2015 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, United States 
U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS., http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm#35-0000 (last modified 
Mar. 30, 2016) (occupation: Fast Food and Counter Workers, occupation code 35-3020). The 
average revenue brought in per employee was $47,060. STATISTA, supra note 32. See also 
Occupational Outlook Handbook: Food and Beverage Serving Related Workers, U.S. BUREAU 
LAB. STATS., http://www.bls.gov/ooh/food-preparation-and-serving/food-and-beverage-serving-
and-related-workers.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2016). The fast-food industry pays the minimum 
wage to a higher proportion of its employees than any other American industry. SCHLOSSER, 
supra note 16, at 73.  
 37. SCHLOSSER, supra note 16, at 73. The actual value and spending potential of the U.S. 
dollar has decreased while the minimum wage did not rise enough to maintain pace. DeSilver, 
supra note 8. 
 38. Patton, supra note 29.  
 39. Steven Greenhouse, Fighting Back Against Wretched Wages, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/sunday-review/fighting-back-against-wretched-
wages.html. U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS., supra note 36.  
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“[f]ast-food restaurants have added positions more than twice as fast 
as the U.S. average,”40 and, as workers are staying in fast-food 
positions longer and trying to support themselves and possibly a 
family,
41
 a population who has historically been unable to unionize
42
 
may require new avenues of worker advocacy.
43
  
B. Labor Unions 
Labor unions have traditionally equalized power disparities 
between employers and employees to alleviate inequities in pay and 
facilitate bargaining over working conditions.
44
 Congress recognized 
the power disparity between workers and management and enacted 
the NLRA,
45
 which provides private sector employees legal 
protections to organize, communicate, and act collectively.
46
 The 
NLRA additionally set up a single procedure by which to enforce 
labor rights, conduct union elections, and bring claims of unfair labor 
practices to court through its administrative agency, the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
47
 The NLRA has been only 
minimally amended and functions very similarly to the way it 
 
 40. See Patton, supra note 29.  
 41. Ben Casselman, It’s Getting Harder to Move Beyond a Minimum-Wage Job, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 8, 2015), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/its-getting-harder-to-
move-beyond-a-minimum-wage-job/#fn-3. 
 42. Leidner, supra note 34, at 13–14. 
 43. See McGregor, supra note 30. Employee turnover in fast-food restaurants is down 
from 120 percent in 2009 to 90 percent in 2011. Id.  
 44. See, e.g., Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor Law, 
4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 561, 562–53 (2014). “Unions served as a vehicle for worker voice and 
political influence . . . .” Id.  
 45. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2015). The NLRA’s statement of Findings and Policies notes that 
there is an “inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom 
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or 
other forms of ownership association . . . .” Id. 
 46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2015). The NLRA enables workers to engage in concerted 
action free from employer coercion, retaliation, and to bargain collectively with their employer. 
Id. See also Richard B. Freeman, What Can We Learn from the NLRA to Create Labor Law for 
the Twenty-First Century?, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 327, 327 (2010). Freeman notes that 
“[t]he NLRA intended to replace the costly organizational fights that historically marred U.S. 
labor relations with a ‘laboratory conditions’ electoral process . . . .” Id. It also was meant to 
bolster the economy, facilitate labor peace, and create more jobs. Id. 
 47. Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 375 (2007) 
[hereinafter Sachs, Renewal]. The NLRA preempts all state and local rules concerning labor 
rights and unionization. Id. It governs employer and union conduct. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/15
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functioned in the 1940s.
48
 One important amendment however, the 
1947 Taft-Hartley Act, significantly limited the NLRA’s scope of 
worker protections by classifying mass picketing and secondary 
boycotts as unfair labor practices and explicitly excluding supervisors 
from the Act’s protections.49 
Unions played a vital role in the American labor movement and 
have helped reduce poverty and increase the blue-collar worker’s 
standard of living.
50
 “[Unions] were largely responsible for lifting 
significant segments of the working poor into the middle classes.”51 
However, the NLRA remains static
52
 while the U.S. economy, 
technology, and employment sectors have dramatically changed.
53
 
The number of service sector jobs has increased while many 
manufacturing jobs have moved overseas or become obsolete through 
technological advances.
54
 The “ossification”55 of the NLRA through 
 
 48. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1527 (2002) (describing the many ways the NLRA has remained the same). 
 49. Jonathan Fox Harris, Worker Unity and the Law: A Comparative Analysis of the 
National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Hope for the NLRA’s 
Future, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 107, 113 (2009). See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2015). 
Supervisors, unlike employees, have no protection from employer retaliation for engaging in 
union activities. Id.  
 50. THE CENTURY FOUNDATION & NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, WHAT’S NEXT FOR 
ORGANIZED LABOR?: THE REPORT OF THE CENTURY FOUNDATION TASK FORCE ON THE 
FUTURE OF UNIONS 22 (1999). “In the aggregate, union members earn about one-third higher 
wages than nonunion workers . . . .” Id. at 7. About 84 percent of those in unions are covered by 
health insurance, tripling the probability of someone without a high school diploma receiving 
health insurance. Id.  
 51. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 44, at 563. Outside of the employer context, unions 
“lobbied for worker-friendly legislation and campaigned for political candidates whose 
platforms promised law and policy reforms that would benefit workers.” Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers’ 
Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing Today, 8 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 3–4 (2005). Bills reforming the NLRA were voted down or vetoed by 
the President in 1977, 1992, 1994, and 1997. See Estlund, supra note 48, at 1540–41. The 
difficulty in passing labor reform is largely due to the political stalemate between organized 
labor unions and corporate or employer lobbyists. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Sachs, Renewal, supra note 47, at 375 n.4 (“[S]ince the time of the Act’s 
passage, U.S. firms have restructured production systems and rethought human resource 
models. While the new business models are varied and multi-layered, the NLRA now appears 
mismatched to nearly all of them.”). 
 54. DEPT. FOR PROF’L EMPS., THE SERVICE SECTOR: PROJECTIONS AND CURRENT STATS 
(2011), available at http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/Service-Sector-2011.pdf; Jeffery 
M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of Private Sector Unionism: What Next for the 
NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (2007). “A significant factor . . . has been 
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Congress’ failure to amend it has made the law unresponsive to needs 
of the low-income workforce. First, it has led to an increase in unfair 
labor practices
56
 by employers as the NLRA’s penalties fail to deter 
illegal employer practices.
57
 The remedies available to affected 
employees
58
 “operate as de facto penalties” for the employer and 
“results in de facto penalties that are far below those required to 
“effectuate the policies of this Act.”59 As such, the “often fierce 
management opposition”60 to employee union drives is credited with 
lowering union density.
61
  
Next, the NLRA requires employers to negotiate with union 
representatives in “good faith” but does not require employers and 
 
technological advances that reduce the need for labor in production jobs and in occupations 
where job tasks are routinized and programmable . . . .” Id. See also Gordon, supra note 52 
(describing the changing structure of the U.S. economy).  
 55. See Estlund, supra note 48, at 1530. “The core of American labor law has been 
essentially sealed off . . . from democratic revision . . . .” Id. “The basic statutory language, and 
many of the intermediate level principles and procedures through which the essentials of self-
organization and collective bargaining are put into practice, have been nearly frozen, or 
ossified, for over fifty years.” Id. 
 56. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1) (2012). “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer 
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 
section 157. . . .” Id. Section 157 outlines the rights of employees to “self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 157.  
 57. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 46, at 330; John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the 
Needles: A Sequential Model of Union Organizing Drives, 1999–2004, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 3, 15 (2008) (estimating unfair labor practices reduce the probability that a union will 
successfully negotiate a contract by 30 percent with the majority of the impact coming from 
employers precluding a union from forming). See also Cora Lewis, Here’s How Walmart 
Threatened Striking Workers, BUZZFEED NEWS, (Feb. 19, 2016, 1:43 PM), http://www.buzz 
feed.com/coralewis/heres-the-script-walmart-used-to-threaten-staff-who-strike?utm_term=.wwl 
prEw0J#.fo2WyRPAo (Despite workers’ court ordered reinstatement after being fired for 
striking, “A lot of folks are still scared [of being fired for protected, striking activity]. Not 
everyone knows about the ruling, so they think if they strike or participate something will 
happen to them.”).  
 58. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2015). 
 59. Morris M. Kleiner & David Weil, Evaluating the Effectiveness of National Labor 
Relations Act Remedies: Analysis and Comparison with Other Workplace Penalty Policies 7, 
19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16626, 2010). The cost savings from 
continued operation as a nonunion enterprise are potentially much larger than the penalty of 
back pay and lost wages. Id. at 36. 
 60. See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 54, at 1138. 
 61. Freeman, supra note 46, at 330. “NLRB elections have turned into massive employer 
campaigns against unions, in which the supervisors excluded from the protection of the law 
pressure workers to reject the organizing drive.” Id. 
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unions to reach a final collective bargaining agreement.
62
 
Accordingly, it’s estimated that only 48 percent of newly certified 
unions had a contract, or collective bargaining agreement, one year 
after the election establishing the union.
63
 Similarly, NLRA 
restrictions on employer involvement in unions have stifled creativity 
and communication between employers and employees about 
working conditions.
64
  
The franchise model presents particular difficulty in regards to 
unionizing a fast-food restaurant.
65
 Many employees are employed by 
a franchise owner, not the restaurant chain itself.
66
 Accordingly, 
every restaurant under a different employer requires its own union. 
This, coupled with the high turnover rate, makes unionizing 
especially difficult.
67
 Additionally, because fast-food workers are 
considered employees of the franchised location, and not the fast-
food corporation, “even if fast-food workers at a restaurant run by a 
franchisee . . . [unionized], they would not be entitled to negotiate 
with the fast-food corporation, but only with the owner of that 
individual franchise . . . .”68 
After a site is unionized, the NLRA allows for “decertification” of 
the union if a majority of the employees vote to decertify it.
69
 
Decertification can be initiated by newly hired employees or 
employees no longer happy with the current union.
70
 The only 
 
 62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 63. KATE BRONFENBRENNER, ECON. POLICY INST., NO HOLDS BARRED: THE 
INTENSIFICATION OF EMPLOYER OPPOSITION TO ORGANIZING 22 (2009).  
 64. “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (2) to dominate or interfere 
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other 
support to it . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 158. See generally Isquith, infra note 117; Duff, infra note 108. 
 65. Leidner, supra note 34, at 13–14.  
 66. Josh Sanburn, Fast Food Strikes: Unable to Unionize, Workers Borrow Tactics from 
Occupy, TIME (July 30, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/07/30/fast-food-strikes-unable-to-
unionize-workers-borrow-tactics-from-occupy/. 
 67. Leidner, supra note 34, at 14. 
 68. Sévrine Knuchel, Examining Workers’ Rights in International Human Rights Law: 
The Fast-Food Workers’ Movement in the United States, 33 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 9–10 
(2015). 
 69. HR Compl. P 94193 (C.C.H.) (2015), 2015 WL 8767274. The union is then 
“decertified” and no longer represents the employees collectively as their bargaining agent. Id  
 70. Id. Employers cannot fire employees for being part of the union. The Right to Strike, 
NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes (last accessed Aug. 29, 2016). However, employers “may 
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successful unionization of a McDonald’s restaurant was in Mason 
City, Iowa in 1971, which lasted four years until it was decertified.
71
  
A development in the labor field is worker centers—locally 
focused community organizing groups that target specific groups of 
workers, typically low-wage and often immigrant, and aid them in 
organizing and advocating for better working conditions.
72
 Worker 
centers are not the primary bargaining agent at a “shop” and do not 
represent the employees in bargaining agreements. Hence, they are 
not subject to the same labor and strike restrictions as unions and can 
help diverse groups learn how to organize.
73
  
C. Seattle’s Movement 
In Seattle, the $15 per hour minimum resulted from a perfect mix 
of political, economic, and social factors. Politically, Seattle elected 
the city’s first “Socialist Alternative” candidate, Kshama Sawant, in 
November 2013
74
 who made the initiative a major part of her 
platform.
75
 The city was also influenced by the recent passage of a 
$15 per hour minimum wage in SeaTac, WA, a small town south of 
Seattle.
76
 Finally, a majority of the populace supported a higher 
minimum wage.
77
 
 
dismiss unrepresented workers at any time and for any reason not prohibited by law.” See 
Knuchel, supra note 68, at 11. 
 71. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 16, at 76.  
 72. Jennifer Hill, Can Unions Use Worker Center Strategies?: In an Age of Doing More 
with Less, Unions Should Consider Thinking Locally by Acting Globally, 5 FIU L. REV. 551, 
555–58, 566–67 (Spring 2010). 
 73. Kris Maher, Worker Centers Offer a Backdoor Approach to Union Organizing, WALL 
ST. J. (July 24, 2013, 6:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873241443045 
78622050818960988. 
 74. Linda Brill & Liza Javier, Sawant to Become Seattle’s First Socialist City Council 
Member, KING5 NEWS (Nov. 15, 2013, 5:28 PM), http://www.king5.com/story/local/2015/01/ 
18/13350116/. 
 75. Ames O’Toole, Meet the Marxist Behind Seattle’s Wage Hike, CNN MONEY (June 24, 
2014, 10:09 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/24/news/economy/seattle-marxist-minimum-
wage/. 
 76. Karen Weise, How Seattle Agreed to a $15 Minimum Wage Without a Fight, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 8, 2014, 5:36 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/ 
2014-05-08/how-seattle-agreed-to-a-15-minimum-wage-without-a-fight. 
 77. Id. In 2015, 74 percent of Seattle voters were in favor of the $15 wage increase. Rolf, 
supra note 6. Rolf attributes voter support for the increase to the recession, which highlighted 
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The fast-food worker strikes were particularly influential.
78
 The 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU), a labor union 
representing almost two million service industry workers, prepared, 
organized, and funded the walkouts, predominately by financing 
worker centers in cities where walkouts took place.
79
 The strikes led 
to national protests, which turned the issue of fast-food worker pay 
into a national movement reflective of income inequality. These 
protests were successful because the workers “plac[ed] their demands 
in the context of larger social and economic struggles . . . [and] 
tapped into a wider frustration with a [sic] the status quo.”80 
Mayor Murray leveraged political support for the initiative and 
appointed a twenty-four-member group, called the Income Inequality 
Advisory Committee (IIAC), to create an implementation plan for the 
minimum wage increase.
81
 Co-chaired by David Rolf, the president 
of the local SEIU, and Howard Wright, a prominent Seattle 
businessman, the group agreed to a plan within the four-month 
deadline.
82
 The committee had incentive to come up with an 
appropriate plan while they had the power to do so.
83
 The plan was 
ultimately approved by the city council.
84
  
 
growing income inequality, and social movements, such as the Black Friday Wal-Mart worker 
strikes and the “Fight for 15.” Id. 
 78. Id. See also Finnegan, supra note 1. 
 79. See Finnegan, supra note 1. See also Arun Gupta, The Story Behind America’s Fast 
Food Worker Uprising, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2013/nov/11/fast-food-workers-strike-end-game.  
 80. Benjamin Sachs, Why are Harris v. Quinn and Fast Food the Biggest Labor 
Developments of 2014?, ON LABOR (Dec. 18, 2014), http://onlabor.org/2014/12/18/why-are-
harris-v-quinn-and-fast-food-the-biggest-labor-developments-of-2014/ (focusing on Charlotte 
Garden’s reaction) [hereinafter Sachs, Labor Developments]. The SEIU continues to organize 
strikes across the employment sectors. See, e.g., Dylan Rubin, Fast Food News, ON LABOR 
(Dec. 4, 2014), http://onlabor.org/category/fast-food-news/; Laura Shin, Fight for a $15 
Minimum Wage Spreads to New Industries, 190 Cities, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2014, 9:56 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2014/12/04/fight-for-a-15-minimum-wage-spreads-to-
new-industries-190-cities/. 
 81. See Rolf, supra note 6; Weise, supra note 76. The IIAC was comprised of local 
business leaders, union leaders, and community advocates. Rolf, supra note 6. 
 82. See Weise, supra note 76. Mayor Murray threatened an ultimatum where he would 
push his own agenda through the city council if the committee could not reach a consensus. Id. 
See also Rolf, supra note 6.  
 83. Weise, supra note 76. Weise and Rolf note the business community wanted to avoid 
Mayor Murray’s plan, which the Mayor threatened to push through City Council if no other 
agreement was reached. See id. 
 84. Id. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. Why Minimum Wage Legislation Isn’t Enough 
Fast-food workers are looking for higher wages and better 
working conditions. However, the nature of fast-food employment 
does not neatly align with the protections offered by the NLRA, 
leaving workers unable to easily unionize.
85
 First, 52 percent of the 
families of fast-food workers are enrolled in one or more public 
assistance programs and around one in five workers live below the 
poverty line.
86
 Living near the poverty line, many workers are 
unwilling to risk employer retaliation and possible job loss to attempt 
to unionize.
87
 Second, even if a union is certified, despite strong 
employer opposition, employers are not required to come to a 
contractual agreement with unions.
88
 Third, the high turnover rate and 
franchised nature of fast-food restaurants makes organizing a union 
particularly difficult.
89
 For fast-food workers, the NLRA is an ill-
suited and potentially outdated document for enforcing worker rights 
and organizing for collective action.
90
  
In essence, the SEIU-backed “Fight for 15” legislative campaign 
in Seattle, WA negotiated a city-wide pay raise for fast-food workers 
who are unable to unionize. However, legislative action is very 
 
 85. Leidner, supra note 34, at 16. Leidner lists the franchise model, the nature of the job, 
and characteristics of the workers as reasons why “resentment about wages and working 
conditions has not led to unionization.” Id. See also Gordon, supra note 52, at 3 (“Work itself is 
often configured differently, with part-time, temporary, and subcontracted arrangements 
increasingly substituting for direct employment.”). Subcontracted arrangements speak to 
franchisee situations, a common arrangement in fast food, but is largely outside the scope of 
this Note. Id.  
 86. See ALLEGRETTO ET AL., supra note 31. 
 87. See id.; Josh Eidelson, Fast Food Walkout Planned in Chicago, SALON (Apr. 23, 
2013, 9:45 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/04/24/ fast_food_walkout_planned_in_chicago/ 
(describing minimum wage workers who “had initially been hesitant about the strike because of 
the risk of retaliation”).  
 88. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
 89. Leidner, supra note 34, at 16. See also McGregor, supra note 30 (noting that turnover 
in the fast-food industry still hovers around 90 percent). This means for every 100 workers a 
fast-food restaurant hires at the beginning of a year, they will replace 90 of them by the end of 
the same year. Id. 
 90. See Estlund, supra note 48, at 1530 (“The core of American Labor law has been 
essentially sealed off . . . from democratic revision.”). 
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dependent on the political culture of the community. While Seattle 
was able to pass legislation, not all cities have the same political 
climate necessary to support a wage increase.
91
 It would likely be 
difficult, long, and costly to replicate this legislation in the United 
States Congress and in more conservative cities and states.
92
 Next, 
legislative change is a lengthy process, the results of which may not 
address all employee needs. For example, the unpredictable 
scheduling at restaurants, through the use of electronic scheduling, 
leaves workers unable to plan for changes at work.
93
 Additionally, 
higher wages would not address lack of paid sick leave in the 
restaurant industry.
94
 Minimum wage legislation does not address 
employers cutting hours when the restaurant is slow, scheduling 
employees last minute, or scheduling employees for fewer than forty 
hours per week.
95
 Likewise, $15 per hour is less valuable if 
employees only work twenty hours per week.  
Another drawback of relying solely on legislation is it cannot be 
tailored to specific work sites and mandates only minimum 
compliance standards. Legislation sets a “floor” that employers 
cannot go below, but it does not address additional, specific needs of 
employees. “The rights specified in the statutes are not always what 
employees want or need and they may prefer to trade the statutory 
 
 91. Several states have passed laws forbidding cities and municipalities from raising the 
minimum wage. Sophie Quinton, States Battle Cities Over Minimum Wage, PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS (July 13, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/ 
2015/07/13/states-battle-cities-over-minimum-wage.  
 92. See Jana Kasperkevic, Alabama Passes Law Banning Cities and Towns from 
Increasing Minimum Wage, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/feb/26/alabama-passes-law-banning-minimum-wage-increase. See also O’Toole, 
supra note 75 (noting the difficulties Congress has had passing any sort of federal minimum 
wage increase); Steven Greenhouse, VW Workers in Tennessee to Vote on Union, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 4, 2014, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/business/ volkswagen-
workers-in-tennessee-to-vote-on-union-membership.html?_r=0 (noting that while the company 
did not oppose the union drive, many Tennessee lawmakers, including the Governor and US 
Senator Bob Corker, were opposed to it).  
 93. See Kantor, supra note 35.  
 94. See Serving While Sick, RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTERS UNITED (Sept. 30, 
2010), http://rocunited.org/roc-serving-while-sick/. 
 95. Kantor, supra note 35. The author details a parent’s struggle to earn enough money 
working less than forty hours a week at Starbucks and struggling to find consistent day care for 
her son when the automated scheduling technology changes her schedule at the last minute, 
sometimes less than a day in advance. Id. Workers’ needs to plan their schedules is in 
opposition to employers’ desires for flexibility and ability to respond to the market.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
272 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 51:257 
 
 
right for what they actually want or need.”96 Additionally, legislation 
cannot replicate what a union provides employees: a collective 
identity, equal bargaining power, and voice in shaping their working 
conditions.
97
 Finally, legislative dictates must always be enforced 
through the court system, which is often a costly process and relies 
on lawyers to bring employee claims rather than negotiations 
between employers and employees.  
III. PROPOSAL 
A. Expand Worker Centers and Workers’ Councils 
While minimum wage legislation and forming a union are likely 
not the complete answers for fast-food workers,
98
 there are other 
developments in labor law that could be utilized by fast-food and 
potentially other low-income workers affected by the decline of 
unions.  
The first is an emphasis and expanded role for worker centers to 
facilitate community organizing with the support of larger, national 
unions. Worker centers, locally focused community organizing 
groups, could continue to be especially useful for fast-food workers 
where each store must be organized to advocate for legislation, 
unionization, or simply enforce existing rights. Utilizing worker 
centers is a departure from the typical union-organizing model, 
sanctioned under the NLRA, of campaigning with workers at a single 
 
 96. William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New 
Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 276 (2002). Professor Corbett notes we already 
have a statute in place, the NLRA, which could effectively create, through employee voice, 
work place policies tailored to the work site, reducing the need to rely on legislation for 
individualized work place protections. Id.  
 97. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). See also James Sherk, How to Give Workers a Voice Without 
Making Them Join a Union, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2014/03/how-to-give-workers-a-voice-without-making-them-join-a-union/284 
328/. The author notes the NLRA “prohibits almost any formal employee voice on the job 
outside of collective bargaining with a union.” Id.  
 98. See Shannon Gleeson, Going Beyond the Minimum, U.S.NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 
6, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-05-06/a-higher-minimum-wage-alone-
wont-solve-low-wage-workers-problems. Gleeson argues an increased minimum wage may not 
actually benefit workers due to high levels of wage theft and barriers to pursuing claims in the 
legal system. Id.  
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job site and then representing those workers if they vote to 
unionize.
99
 Instead, worker centers help fast-food employees 
“revitalize a practice . . . [of] collective action in support of specific 
workplace demands without first having a union in the workplace.”100 
Often worker centers organize workers to vindicate workplace rights 
through statutes other than the NLRA, such as the Fair Labor 
Standards Act which governs hourly wage violations.
101
 This practice 
is in essence “flipping the script” on typical union organizing and has 
shown to be an effective practice for workers where unionization is 
not feasible.
102
 Organizing outside union membership is being 
utilized by local worker centers, with funding from the SEIU,
103
 and 
is legal for workers to organize and work collectively to advocate for 
better working conditions “outside of the NLRA.”104  
Additionally, most worker centers offer programs to improve 
skills and teach organizing skills or ways “to amplify the collective 
voice.”105 Worker centers offer a critical community organizing tool 
national unions should continue to utilize in greater numbers because 
of their emphasis on organizing immigrant and low-income 
populations.
106
 
 
 99. See Sachs, Renewal, supra note 47, at 377–78. 
 100. See Sachs, Labor Developments, supra note 80. 
 101. Sachs, Renewal, supra note 47, at 391–93. 
 102. See Hill, supra note 72, at 566. See also Sachs, Renewal, supra note 47, at 391 
(highlighting a successful 2001 campaign for unpaid overtime wages by garment factory 
workers and the worker center “Make the Road by Walking,” despite lack of unionization).  
 103. Alejandra Cancino, Union Spent at Least $2 Million Last Year on Fight for $15 
Movement, CHI. TRIB. (May 29, 2014, 12:05 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ 
chi-union-spending-fight-for-15-20140529-story.html. 
 104. “Employees shall have the right to . . . engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 157 
(2015) (emphasis added). See also Nicole Hallett, From the Picket Line to the Courtroom: A 
Labor Organizing Privilege to Protect Workers, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 475, 478 
(2015) (noting workers centers are not restricted like typical unions).  
 However, despite the illegality, employees still face the risk of illegal employer retaliation 
to collective action. See Maher, supra note 73; Freeman, supra note 46, at 331; and Steven 
Greenhouse, McDonald’s Ruling Could Open Door for Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2014, at 
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/business/nlrb-holds-mcdonalds-not-just-
franchisees-liable-for-worker-treatment.html?_r=0. 
 105. See Hill, supra note 72, at 558. Programs include teaching workers organizing 
techniques, and skills training. Id. at 572–73.  
 106. English is the second language for one-sixth of workers in the U.S. restaurant 
industry. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 16, at 70. One-third of that group does not speak English. 
Id. at 70–71. 
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However, many are critical of worker centers for being too close 
with unions and allegedly circumventing the NLRA.
107
 Some argue 
worker centers are simply a way for unions to organize secondary 
boycotts, and other organizing tools banned by the NLRA, to use 
against employers.
108
 Worker centers must be careful to avoid acting 
as unions or functioning as the bargaining agents of workers. In sum, 
worker centers are a valuable option to help fast-food workers 
organize for whatever goals they choose to advance, whether it’s 
legislative change, enforcing statutory rights for work place 
violations apart from the NLRA, or pressuring specific employers for 
site-specific changes.  
A second development which could benefit both employers and 
employees is the “works council,” advocated by Harvard Law 
Professor Benjamin Sachs. The works council is a European model of 
collective bargaining, used widely in Germany and other countries,
109
 
and, broadly defined, is an “institutionalized bod[y] for representative 
communication between a single employer and the employees of a 
single plant or enterprise.”110 A works council represents employees 
in communications with the employer, regardless of their union 
affiliation,
111
 by facilitating communication between employer and 
employees. Councils give employees a direct and common voice in 
employer policies.
112
 Notably, councils do not call strikes or negotiate 
 
 107. See Maher, supra note 73. 
 108. Id. For additional information see About, WORKER CENTERS, http://workercenters. 
com/about/ (last accessed Sept. 22, 2016), a website opposed to worker centers. For example,  
employers worry employees of different industries (such as Wal-Mart and McDonald’s) may 
collaborate with each other to protest outside the different stores, which could trigger NLRA 
sanctions. See Michael C. Duff, Alt-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor 
Organization Bargain, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 837, 838–89 (2014). 
 109. See Homer, infra note 111. 
 110. JOEL ROGERS & WOLFGANG STREEK, WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, 
REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 6 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1995). 
The broad definition includes the many different forms and functions of works councils 
throughout Europe. Id.  
 111. Rachel Homer, An Explainer: What Are German-Style Works Councils?, ON LABOR 
(Sept. 23, 2013), http://onlabor.org/2013/09/23/an-explainer-what-are-german-style-works-
councils/. Councils and unions often co-exist in a workplace, either merging together into one 
entity to existing independently with separate roles. See ROGERS & STREEK, supra note 110, at 
6–7.  
 112. ROGERS & STREEK, supra note 110, at 8 (“[Councils] typically aggregate the views of 
workers . . . .)”. 
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wage issues.
113
 Three basic types of councils exist in Europe: 
(1) Paternalistic Councils, formed by the employer primarily to 
prevent unionization; (2) Consultative Councils, designed to enhance 
economic competitiveness of the firm through cooperation and 
communication between employees and management; and 
(3) Representative Councils, frequently authorized through 
legislation, which enable employees to assert “distributional rights,” 
as part of a firm’s political system.114 
In Germany, works councils coexist with powerful, national 
unions, which help pressure employers to act on works council 
demands for fear of a strike.
115
 Advocates call for works councils to 
be implemented in the US as a way of giving employees, who 
otherwise cannot unionize, a voice in employer work conditions.
116
  
However, there is much critique surrounding works councils and 
impediments to implementation. Most importantly, the legal structure 
of the NLRA prevents “company unions,” groups without official 
union status that are sanctioned by the employer, from bargaining 
over wages and the terms and conditions of employment.
117
 
Currently, in the United States, a works council likely could only 
exist under the umbrella of a certified union.
118
 Recently, The VW 
Volkswagen plant in Tennessee had set up a forum similar to their 
“worker councils” in Germany, which inspired both praise and 
 
 113. See Homer, supra note 111. This is reserved for unions. 
 114. ROGERS & STREEK, supra note 110, at 10. 
 115. Janice R. Bellace, The Role of the Law in Supporting Cooperative Employee 
Representation Systems, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 441, 446 (1994). “In the United States, there are 
no mechanisms for worker representation which have statutory backing other than collective 
bargaining. Moreover, there is no widespread management practice of voluntarily engaging in 
bipartite discussions with independent employee groups.” Id. at 443 (citation omitted). 
 116. See Homer, supra note 111. 
 117. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (2) to 
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization . . . .”). See 
also Elias Isquith, “Working Full-Time and Yet Still Needing Public Benefits”: Leading Expert 
Urges McDonald’s to Come to the Table, SALON (Oct. 31, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://www.salon. 
com/2014/10/31/working_full_time_and_yet_still_needing_public_benefits_leading_expert_ 
urges_mcdonalds_to_come_to_the_table/. 
 118. Id. See also Neal E. Boudette, Volkswagen Reverses Course on Union at Tennessee 
Plant, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/26/business/volkswagen-
reverses-courseon-union-at-tennessee-plant.html?_r=1. 
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critique.
119
 The VW plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee allowed 
minority unions, different groups with support but no majority vote, 
to bargain and meet with management.
120
 Many applauded this 
decision to give employees a voice.
121
 However, some feared it 
facilitates the further undoing of unions by “allowing representative 
bodies without collective bargaining rights [that] could create a 
system of ‘fake representation,’ without real worker power.”122 
However, the discussions at the VW plant are currently moot. After a 
large portion of VW’s senior management changed following 
revelations the company implemented software to “cheat” emissions 
testing, the company is now vigorously fighting against recognizing 
the UAW, after the Tennessee plant’s maintenance workers voted to 
unionize.
123
 Regardless, works councils are an option worth exploring 
because fast-food workers face many struggles organizing and have 
little voice in discussions concerning their employment. 
CONCLUSION 
While none of these methods of organizing or statutory changes 
can fill the gap left by unions in terms of providing employees with a 
voice and determining their working, and sometimes living, 
 
 119. See, e.g., Benjamin Sachs, Minority Unionism (Sort Of) Comes to VW Chattanooga, 
ON LABOR (Nov. 12, 2014), http://onlabor.org/2014/11/12/minority-unionism-sort-of-comes-to-
vw-chattanooga/; Benjamin Sachs, WSJ Columnist Jenkins Gets Works-Council Law Wrong, 
ON LABOR (Sept. 19, 2013), http://onlabor.org/2013/09/19/wsj-columnist-jenkins-gets-the-law-
wrong-on-vw-works-council/; Policy Summary of Community Organization Engagement, 
VOLKSWAGEN (NOV. 12, 2014), available at https://onlabor.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/vw-
community organizationengagement.pdf. 
 120. Steven Greenhouse, VW to Allow Labor Groups to Represent Workers at Chattanooga 
Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2014, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/ 
business/vw-to-allow-labor-groups-to-represent-workers-at-chattanooga-plant.html.  
 121. See Homer, supra note 111.  
 122. Lydia DePillis, The Strange Case of the Anti-Union Union at Volkswagen’s Plant in 
Tennessee, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/ 
wp/2014/11/19/the-strange-case-of-the-anti-union-union-at-volkswagens-plant-in-tennessee/. 
Additionally, many are skeptical of workers’ councils because one of the groups lobbying for 
support, America Council of Employees, has not released any information about its funding or 
donors, leading many to speculate that it is funded by anti-union advocates. Times Free Press 
Staff, ACE, with 381 VW Members, Bills Itself as UAW Alternative, TIMES FREE PRESS (May 
28, 2015), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/story/2015/may/28/ 
ace-381-vw-members-bills-itself-uaw-alternati/306608/.  
 123. Boudette, supra note 118. 
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conditions, together they may be able to fill some of the needs left by 
the decline in union membership. Low wages and the inability to 
organize has turned the fast-food industry into a pipeline to poverty, 
creating a permanent underclass dependent on government assistance. 
However, it does not have to be this way. Unlike globalized 
manufacturing, “[fast-food restaurants] compete on a domestic and 
level playing field . . . the low-wage structure of fast-food . . . reflects 
a mixture of market conditions and policy choices about minimum 
standards for work.”124 Through a combination of legislative action 
resulting from the “Fight for 15,” increased use of worker centers to 
target low-income employees in communities, and expanded 
inquiries into other methods of employer/employee communication 
channels such as works councils, the United States can make policy 
choices that reflect the intrinsic value of all persons, regardless of 
income level.  
 
 124. See ALLEGRETTO ET AL., supra note 31, at 11. The researchers contrast the United 
States fast-food industry with American manufacturing plants that are subject to globalization 
and whose labor can be outsourced. Id. In contrast, all American fast-food restaurants share the 
same customer base and cannot be outsourced. This creates a positive atmosphere for change.  
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